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The COVID-19 virus pandemic has again demonstrated the devastating impact that a microbial 
pathogen can have on our health, society and economic systems. It necessitates a fundamental 
rethink of how the security of our societies can be better sustained. This rethinking will require 
many aspects of our security systems to be re-examined, but we concentrate here on the 
consequences of the rapid advances being made in the life and associated sciences. In this 
chapter, we will describe and analyse one of the most likely means by which the BTWC could 
be strengthened at the 9th Review Conference, namely: agreement of an International 
Aspirational Code of Conduct supported by mandatory biological security education for life 
and associated scientists. We conclude that a vigorous effort by civil society will be needed to 
assist the achievement of an agreement on this issue at the 9th Review Conference. 
 













Following the failure of the 2016 8th Five-Year Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) to agree anything other than to meet again at the end of 2017, 
the 4th Intersessional Process leading up to the 2021 9th Review Conference was rescued by a 
joint proposal by the three Depositary States – the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA.1 
This allowed the 2017 meeting to agree that Meetings of Experts and Meetings of States Parties 
(States who sign to the Convention) would take place in 2018, 2019 and 2020 in order to 
develop proposals that could be brought to the 9th Review Conference in 2021. Then, however, 
because of the COVID-19 pandemic2, the final stages of this process became compressed with 
the 2020 Meeting of Experts scheduled for the end of the year rather than in the summer, the 
2020 Meeting of States Parties moved to April 2021 and combined with the first session of the 
meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference, and the Preparatory 
Committee scheduled to meet again in the summer of 2021 before the Review Conference at 
the end of the year. 
 Nevertheless, it might be expected that after the pandemic, heath security, including 
biological security,3 would be a political priority across the world,4,5 but the long history of 
difficulties in agreeing measures to develop the BTWC suggests that such progress may well 
not be possible without a concerted effort by States Parties and civil society. With that caution 
in mind, this chapter describes and analyses one of the most likely means by which the BTWC 
could be strengthened at the 9th Review Conference, namely: agreement of an International 
Aspirational Code of Conduct supported by mandatory biological security education for life 
and associated scientists.6  
2. The Gap in the Web of Prevention 
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Amazing advances are taking place in the life and associated sciences and are underpinning a 
revolution in our biotechnology capabilities. The improved capabilities will yield much that is 
good for our societies, but they could also be misused for hostile purposes in novel and 
dangerous chemical and biological weapons. That raises the difficult problem of dual use – the 
fact that7 “knowledge and technologies used for beneficial purposes can also be misused for 
harmful purposes.”  Yet, unfortunately there is substantial evidence showing that few 
practicing life scientists (and other scientists involved in the biotechnology revolution) are even 
aware of the dangers of dual use, or of the history8 of the way that scientific advances in the 
last century fed into the largescale offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes of 
major States.9 
 At a major meeting in Zagreb in 2018, a wide range of experts from around the world 
reviewed the arrangements in place for dealing with the problem of dual use. Instead of a 
systematic set of integrated measures, the meeting noted the existence of a disparate jigsaw of 
measures in place to different extents in different countries and regions. 10  A conceptual 
framework for an integrated approach to biological security had been developed some years 
earlier involving international regulations, policies, and guidelines for promoting a 
comprehensive and integrated system to the management of biological risks in the twenty-first 
century. However, there was little evidence that this framing of biological security had resulted 
in the adoption of concrete measures. The framework is centred on the concept of a ‘web of 
prevention’ which originated in the early 1990s as the idea of a ‘web of deterrence’. The web 
of prevention11 refers to the different strands/lines of action that are required for effective 
biological risk management, regardless of whether biological risks occur naturally, accidentally 
or deliberately.  
             Understanding the role that science professionals could make to this framing has been 
a preoccupation of advocates of the notion of a ‘web of prevention’ in research conducted over 
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the last decades and these investigations have suggested that on a worldwide basis those 
working in the life and associated sciences were largely unaware of the problem of dual use. 
How science professionals might add their expertise to preventing the hostile misuse of their 
work had, however, remained unclear under the notion of the ‘web of prevention’. Indeed, a 
similar problem had existed in the chemical sciences, but as shown in the next section, that 
issue was starting to be addressed by the development and implementation of an international 
aspirational code of conduct and through the idea of fostering the implementation of related 
educational provision for raising awareness amongst practicing scientists of the importance of 
chemical security, about the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and 
about the role of chemical science professionals in contributing to strengthening both former 
and latter.  
3. The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Work of the Advisory Board for Education and 
Outreach 
Implementation of the 1993 CWC has been heralded as a multi-lateral success story. Embodied 
in CWC is a powerful international norm against the development, use, preparation, and against 
assistance by and of States in activity relating to chemical weapons that is prohibited under the 
Convention. This requires States Parties to “…never under any circumstances:  (a) To develop, 
produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or 
indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; (b) To use chemical weapons;  (c) To engage in any 
military preparations to use chemical weapons;  (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, 
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”  
 Non-proliferation together with disarmament, assistance and protection, and 
international cooperation are the four pillars of the CWC. Since its entry into force in 1997, 
193 of the world’s 197 recognised States have joined the Convention, 98% of the world 
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population now live under the protection of its provisions, and 98% of the world’s chemical 
stockpiles having been verifiably destroyed. Maintenance of the Convention is being 
considered in the context of a changing economic, political, scientific, and technological and 
security environment.   
            As noted by Husbands and Suarez12 based on principle that “…achievements in the 
field of chemistry should be used to benefit humankind and the environment”, it is in this light 
that the Convention had moved to embrace a set of guidelines for science professionals that 
were intended to serve as: “…elements for ethical codes and discussion points for ethics issues 
related to the practice of chemistry under the Convention…”  
 At the 19th Session of the Conference of States Parties of the CWC in 2014, as part of 
an initiative to seek to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, a proposal was thus 
endorsed to develop an ethical code for chemistry professionals. Subsequent workshops 
organised by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) involving a 
broad range of stakeholders including chemical science professionals, academia and industry, 
consulted broadly as to how draft ethical guidelines might be aligned with norms embodied in 
the CWC and drawing on best practice and upon other relevant experience a consensus text 
emerged in 2015 resulting in what are known as the Hague Ethical Guidelines.  
 The role of civil society has been particularly important in achieving this objective. 
There has been a long history of involvement of the International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry (IUPAC) in the scientific and technical issues involved in strengthening the CWC 
and this participation of civil society was well illustrated in the development of the Guidelines. 




 “The German government provided special funds for two workshops in 2015 to 
develop the text for ethical guidelines. The project was notable because although funded 
and organised via the OPCW, the work was done by an international group of 35 
scientists from academia and the chemical industry of 24 countries from all regions of 
the world…”   
 
 According to the Hague Ethical Guidelines 14 , key elements include: “Core element, 
Sustainability, Education, Awareness and engagement, Ethics, Safety and security, 
Accountability, Oversight, and Exchange of information.” 
             The congruence between education and outreach in affecting the efficient and effective 
implementation of the Hague Ethical Guidelines is clear, and at the Twentieth Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties, in December 2015, in accordance with the recommendation 
of the report of the Temporary Working Group on Education and Outreach of the Scientific 
Advisory Board, the Director-General was called upon15 to set up an Advisory Board on 
Education and Outreach (ABEO). ABEO thereafter took implementation of the Guidelines as 
one of its tasks.  
 In relation to contemporary education research on linking theory and practice in 
teaching and learning, a 2018 ABEO report noted the potential of active learning approaches 
including- problem based learning as well as the use of case studies.  As well as a range of 
active learning approaches, the report also noted the importance and ‘proven effectiveness’ of 
online technologies and their potential to be used in addressing deficits in teaching and learning 
about the importance of preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. The report noted 
that active learning might also be adopted in training programmes in professional organisations 
and societies, and in international disciplinary unions and industry. Indeed, the above 
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approaches were deemed: “potentially relevant to the OPCW’s extensive capacity-building 
programmes” and due to the potential they demonstrated as a portfolio of activities as models 
that form an integral part of the overall set of actions covered by the OPCW’s commitment to 
the “prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons.” 
 Together, adoption by the Hague Ethical Guidelines, as well as the emphasis placed by 
the Organisation on the importance of education and outreach activities and the creation of a 
sense of ownership among chemical science professionals in the Convention, represent a 
possible model for the ways in which implementation of the BTWC might be improved through 
adoption of a Code of Conduct for life sciences where a clear emphasis is placed upon 
awareness-raising and education as well as on the importance of engagement of life science 
professionals with the BWC. 
4. Codes of Conduct, Awareness-Raising and Education for Life Scientists 
4.1 Introduction: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention  
March 2020 marked the 45th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC). It is a multilateral treaty of indefinite duration and currently has 183 States 
Parties and four signatories. Ten states have neither signed nor ratified the BWC.16 Since the 
5th BTWC Review Conference in 2005-06, States Parties have held annual meetings in a series 
of Intersessional Processes (ISPs) during the years between its five-yearly review conferences.  
The ISPs generally have Meetings of Experts (MXs) in the middle of each year and Meetings 
of States Parties at the end of each year, but the BTWC does not have a large international 
organisation like the OPCW for implementation of the convention. 





• Biological agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes";  
• Weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles "designed to use such agents or toxins for 
hostile purposes or in armed conflict." 
 
The Convention has been violated in the past. The Soviet Union, one of the Convention's 
Depositary States, maintained an offensive biological weapons program after ratifying the 
BTWC. Russia says that this program has been terminated. Iraq violated its commitments as a 
Signatory State with its biological weapons program, which was uncovered by the UN Special 
Commission on Iraq. Iraq became a State Party after the Gulf War. In a 2020 report on 
compliance with the BTWC, the United States indicated that it still had outstanding compliance 
concerns in relation to four States.17  
4.2 The BTWC and the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
An important input into the negotiations for the BTWC was a WHO study entitled Health 
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons published in 1970.  In 2004, the WHO produced 
an updated version of this study titled Public health response to biological and chemical 
weapons: WHO guidance.18 From these studies it is obviously clear that there is an overlap in 
activities between the WHO and the BWC, and concerns have been raised about any roles that 
might be perceived as bringing the WHO into the security realm with potential negative 
consequences for other health work. For centuries, allegations have been made about the 
misuse of disease. While difficult, an effective response to this has been to examine any 
available information in factual terms particularly in the context of the capabilities of the life 
sciences at the time.19 
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 Clearly, an attack with biological weapons that produced casualties would have a 
significant public health impact.  If a biological attack were to be carried out using a disease 
that has limited spread from one human to another, such as anthrax, the casualties while 
potentially large would be limited to those exposed to the pathogens from the delivery system. 
A biological attack using a disease with significant human-to-human transmission, such as 
smallpox, could mean that disease would spread widely across the population; the measures 
for detecting and controlling this spread would be the same as for naturally occurring disease. 
Similar concerns relate to very dangerous animal and plant diseases.20  
 The Eighth Review Conference21 (2016) recognized the “fundamental importance” of 
enhancing international cooperation and agreed on the value of “working together to promote 
capacity building in the fields of vaccine and drug production, disease surveillance, detection, 
diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases as well as biological risk management”. The 
Conference affirmed that “building such capacity would directly support the achievement of 
the objectives of the Convention.” It also acknowledged “the need to address the lack of ready 
operational capacity” as a lesson from the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa. 
 An assumption in much contemporary discussion is that the impact of COVID-19 could 
inspire an increased interest in development or use of biological weapons particularly in the 
messy hybrid warfare that characterises contemporary conflict.22 As the capabilities of the life 
and associated sciences continues to increase rapidly the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted 
possible vulnerabilities that potential perpetrators might look to in the future.23 In short, the 
COVID-19 pandemic has important implications for the BTWC, particularly the need to 
significantly strengthen its implementation. 
4.3 The BTWC and Dual Use 
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At the meeting of BTWC States Parties in December 201724 it was agreed that the Meeting of 
Experts during the ISP would consider the following subjects back to back, as illustrated below: 
 
 “MX1 – Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening 
 Cooperation and Assistance under Article X; 
 MX2 - Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to 
 the Convention; 
 MX3 – Strengthening National Implementation; 
 MX4 – Assistance, Response and Preparedness; 
MX5 – Institutional Strengthening of the Convention.” 
 
The same topics would then be dealt with at the Meetings of States Parties later in the years.  
 The meetings were obviously dealing with a vast and diverse agenda, and within MX2 
on science and technology there was also a packed agenda to: 
• “Review of science and technology developments relevant to the Convention, including 
for the enhanced implementation of all articles of the Convention as well as the 
identification of potential benefits and risks of new science and technology 
developments relevant to the Convention, with a particular attention to positive 
implications…” 
Clearly, there was little time to consider codes of conduct in details within such a short period 
of time. However, this matter had already been given considerable attention by States Parties 
over the preceding two decades.   
4.4 Codes of Conduct and Education  
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At the 2005 Meeting of Experts there was an initial attempt to deal seriously with the issue of 
codes of conduct with large numbers of papers being produced for the meetings25,26. But even 
in 2005 just introducing a code of conduct was not seen to be sufficient to deal with the problem 
of the potential misuse of research by some of the States Parties. The need for raising awareness 
and education of life scientists was reiterated by several States27,28,29,30. Given the level of 
interest it was unsurprising that the 6th Review Conference in 2006 decided that in 2008 during 
the Second Intersessional Process States Parties would focus on:31 
 
“…Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes 
of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science 
and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the 
Convention.” 
 
What it is important to understand is that in 2008 it was still often believed that just developing 
a code could be the means to raise awareness of the problem of dual use amongst 
scientists32 ,33 ,34 .  However, progress was being made in the development of educational 
material linked to the BTWC for life scientists.  
 Lack of education about dual use was again noted in a contribution by Japan to a joint 
Working Paper at the Seventh Review Conference in 201135.  The National Defense Medical 
College (NDMC) in Japan and the University of Bradford in the UK conducted collaborative 
research to analyse the current state of biosecurity education in Japan. They also jointly 
developed an online learning module in applied dual-use biosecurity education. The Third 
Intersessional Process following the Review Conference was agreed to consider as part of the 




“(d) voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage responsible conduct by 
scientists, academia and industry;  
(e) education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life sciences and 
biotechnology…” 
 
Then, the Meeting of States Parties in 2015 concluded that:37  
 
“To further address education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life 
sciences and biotechnology, States Parties recognized that the continuous and 
accelerating rate of progress in scientific knowledge requires the necessity of deepening 
a culture of responsible use of this knowledge, which takes into account the object and 
purpose of the Convention without undermining peaceful uses.”  
 
In order to further efforts on education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of life 
sciences and biotechnology, States Parties discussed the need to share information and 
knowledge on these developments, including dual-use research of concern.  
 The Gain of Function Debate38 (2011-2015) is a typical example of showing the gap 
between life scientist and politicians. CRISPR-Cas39 is another example of great need for the 
Code of Conduct. Bioethics issues of CRISPR-Cas9 need to be carefully scrutinised. Although 
CRISPR-Cas9 has a lot of benefits for our life, it also has a bioethical issue40,41,42,43. We know 
that in research benefits we need must be greater than risks. Greater attention must be placed 
on risks, since they may damage our living or the environment. The application of CRISPR-
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Cas9 technique involves risks since it may produce mutation which can be deleterious. 
Bioethical concerns also arise when this technology is used to alter genomes in the human 
germline.  
 In 2016 at the Preparatory Committee for the Seventh Review Conference China and 
Pakistan put forward an important proposal for the development of a template for a code of 
conduct. Their Working Paper stated that:44 
  
“With the aim to prevent abuse and misuse of bioscience and technology, fulfil the aims 
and objectives of the Convention and strengthen global biosecurity governance, China 
has proposed the development of a template of biological scientist code of conduct within 
the framework of the Convention in December 2015…” 
  
The paper pointed out that many States had indicated support for an agreed code of conduct 
and provided suggestions. At the Review Conference itself Ukraine and the UK, reflecting on 
their own joint studies and research, pressed the case for serious attention to be given to the 
education of scientists given the current lack of awareness of the Convention and its 
implications.45 
 The Ukraine, Japan and the UK again pressed the case for serious attention to be given 
to education at the 2017 Meeting of States Parties in a Working Paper on recent developments 
in awareness-raising, education and outreach.46 Finally, China and Pakistan made a clear-cut 
proposal for bringing this long period of development to a conclusion at the Ninth Review 
Conference in 202147. They presented a Working Paper at the 2018 Meeting of Experts that 
included a draft Model Code of Conduct for Biological Scientists. 
 
 15 
 The presentation at the Meeting of Experts had been preceded by an international 
conference in Tianjin, China on Building a Global Community of Shared Future for Biosecurity: 
Development of a Code of Conduct for Biological Scientists at which China’s ideas for the code 
were discussed in detail by a range of 28 experts from 14 different countries, 6 experts from 
international organisations and a large host delegation from China itself. The conference lead 
to the addition of educational elements to the proposed code of conduct, but the new version 
of the code also retained the kind of international cooperation that will be needed for example 
to deal with threats of the kind illustrated by the present COVID-19 outbreak (Table 1).  
Table 1: Elements of the 2018 China Draft Model Code of Conduct for Biological Scientists 
1. Research Integrity 
2. Respect for the Object of Research 
3. Process Management for Science Research 
4. Constraint on the Spread of Research Outcome 
5. Popularisation of Science and Technology 
6. Institution’s Role 
7. Education and Training 
8. Awareness and Engagement 
9. International Exchanges 
 
Then in his report of the meeting the Chair of the MX2 Session on science and technology 
concluded that such a code of conduct would be one of the elements that had most chance of 
being agreed at the Ninth Review Conference48. It is important to stress that what was being 
proposed is quite analogous to the Hague Ethical Guidelines for chemists. It is an Aspirational 
Code (like the Hippocratic Oath for medical doctors) that can be implemented in more stringent 
codes to fit the circumstances of different State Parties, but which will require education and 
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awareness-raising about the BTWC and the problem of dual use. How this plays out will 
depend on how well meetings of the BTWC succeed in 2020 and 2021 in the lead up to the 
decision making 9th Review Conference. 
 There have been various development and implementation projects concerned with 
teaching life scientists about biological security and the problem of dual use. These were given 
a thorough review recently which resulted in similar conclusions to those developed for 
chemists. The reviewer stated that in order to be effective attention has to be given to three 
main points:49  
 
“…First, materials and resources need to be made widely available and accessible…. 
Second in order to reach as many stakeholders as possible, it is recommended that 
materials are available in different languages. Third…training materials and resources 
are developed in a user-friendly manner, so as to enable lecturers and educators to use 
them easily without the need for extensive prior preparation or training.” 
 
 
Given the massive task of awareness-raising about the BTWC, dual use and biological security 
in general, these seem eminently sensible suggestions. It is also quite clear that active learning 
methods, such as Team-Based Learning50,51 are by far the best way to present this kind of 
material to scientists. The review also stressed that education was not a solution to the problem 
of dual use in itself, but only within the context of an effective code of conduct for the scientists 
involved. 
5. Conclusions 
When the COVID-19 pandemic is over there will be many questions to be answered about how 
our biological security can be improved. Certainly, some of these questions will be focused on 
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how the BTWC can be strengthened. Given the history of the convention it surely cannot be 
assumed that this will be an easy task. Therefore, it may well be that the best approach is to 
concentrate on issues that appear to be the least contentious and costly, but which could make 
a significant difference. One such issue is the potential agreement of an international 
Aspirational Code of Conduct with awareness-raising and education as an integral element. 
This approach has the great advantage of having been implemented recently in support of the 
CWC and has been well discussed over two decades within the orbit of the BTWC. It would 
not commit any State Party to immediate major activities but would allow States that are able 
to do so to pioneer innovative approaches that can be reported back and copied later by others. 
The whole approach would have the benefit of bringing many more people with expert 
knowledge into engagement with the convention while helping to minimise the problem of dual 
use. 
 However, it has to be understood that the CWC had the advantages of a major 
international organisation (OPCW) and the strong long term engagement of the International 
Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry in developing the Hague Ethical Guidelines, and the 
ABEO to carry out its investigation and report on the best ways forward for education. The 
BTWC lacks many of these advantages and so an important question is whether civil society 
is able, during the lead up to the 9th Review Conference, to provide some strong backing for 
States Parties interested in agreeing an effective international code with education and 
awareness-raising as one of its key elements. Whether the BTWC 9th Review Conference does 
move along the lines that the CWC has developed over the last decade will be much dependent 
on the preparatory meetings to be held in late 2020 and early 2021 in the lead up to the review 
and civil society should pay particular attention to these proceedings if it wants to contribute 
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